How to Get There When You Are There Already? Defining Presence in Virtual Reality and the Importance of Perceived Realism by Weber, Stefan et al.
OPINION
published: 06 May 2021
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.628298
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 628298
Edited by:
Francesco Ferrise,
Politecnico di Milano, Italy
Reviewed by:
Valentin Schwind,
Frankfurt University of Applied
Sciences, Germany
Giada Brianza,





This article was submitted to
Human-Media Interaction,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 11 November 2020
Accepted: 08 April 2021
Published: 06 May 2021
Citation:
Weber S, Weibel D and Mast FW
(2021) How to Get There When You
Are There Already? Defining Presence




How to Get There When You Are
There Already? Defining Presence in
Virtual Reality and the Importance of
Perceived Realism
Stefan Weber 1,2, David Weibel 1* and Fred W. Mast 1
1Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 2 Faculty of Psychology, Swiss Distance University
Institute, Brig, Switzerland
Keywords: presence, perceived realism, virtual reality, immersion, absorption
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the current opinion paper is to challenge the current definition of presence in the
context of virtual reality (VR). Opticians do not only measure visual acuity but also the visual
field, stereoscopic vision, and color vision. In the same vein, presence researchers are encouraged
to not only measure the experience of “being there” in the sense of attentional allocation to the
virtual environment (VE), but also the perceived realism of the VE. Perceived realism is the result
of an evaluation of the virtual world regarding (1) the subjective degree of reality of the depicted
environment and (2) its overall plausibility and credibility. Thus, the sense of presence in a VE is
conceived as a composite of being there and perceived realism. When in VR, a user will inevitably
compare the look of virtual objects to real-world objects and judge the level of congruence (Sutcliffe
and Gault, 2004). The user evaluates the plausibility and naturalness of the depicted world as well
as the ease of interaction within the VE by answering questions such as: is there a shadow cast? Are
the proportions of objects correct? Does the environment correspond tomy ownmovements? Does
my virtual body match the proportions of my real body? Just like the visual features, a story and
its characters are also evaluated in terms of consistency and plausibility (Park et al., 2010; Gorini
et al., 2011): are the consequences of actions plausible? Is the story coherent in itself? Does the
causal sequence of events make sense? The answers to these questions define the degree of perceived
realism. Perceived realism leads to the experience that a user not only feels surrounded by the VE,
but rather has a compelling sense of reality and in extreme cases even forgets that he or she is
wearing a head-mounted display (HMD).
Previous papers on presence are based on the assumption that realism enhances presence (e.g.,
Heeter, 1992; Welch et al., 1996; Lombard and Ditton, 1997; Bystrom et al., 1999) suggested
a conceptualization of presence as the degree to which a medium seems realistic. Interestingly,
perceived realism is nevertheless not part of the most widely used presence definitions. It is either
a possible trigger of presence or is blended in with the term being there. The conceptualization of
presence as the experience of being there in a mediated environment dominates current presence
definitions. Being there is strongly associated with attentional allocation and the sensation of being
surrounded and absorbed by a mediated world. However, we claim that presence in VR requires
much more than just being there. With the widespread use of immersive VR technology, it has
become an easy task to absorb users in a VE. Thus, judgments about the realism of the VE become
increasingly important. Being there and perceived realism are both important but yet different
aspects of presence. They need to be combined in order to (1) adequately describe and define the
experience of presence and (2) to obtain an appropriate and more complete assessment of presence
in VR. Thus, theories andmeasures of presence need to be extended and establish perceived realism
as an important domain besides being there.
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PRESENCE IN VR AS A
TWO-DIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT: BEING
THERE AND PERCEIVED REALISM
Existing Definitions of Presence
Presence is a shortened term for telepresence and was first
introduced by Minsky (1980). Presence is defined as the sense
of being in a mediated environment (Steuer, 1992; Draper et al.,
1998) or being in a computer-generated world such as in VR
(Sheridan, 1992; Slater andWilbur, 1997). The sensation can thus
be described as the sense of being spatially present at remote
places displayed by technical interfaces (Weibel and Wissmath,
2011). Since the concept was first mentioned over 40 years ago,
the goal of achieving presence has been considered a crucial
if not the most crucial aspect of a successful VR experience
(Weech et al., 2019). Several review articles exist which all address
the history of presence and its various definitions (McMahan,
2003; Lee, 2004; Hartmann et al., 2015b; Nilsson et al., 2016;
Skarbez et al., 2017; Curran, 2018). In the following, we restrict
ourselves to the most influential definitions of presence and
their commonalities.
According to Steuer (1992), presence is the extent to which
one’s attention is allocated to the mediated environment rather
than to the immediate physical environment. Even though, it has
been a challenge for researchers to develop a widely accepted
description of the phenomenon (cf. Grassini and Laumann,
2020), a consensus has been established regarding the definition,
and the term being there is widely used to describe presence
(Sheridan, 1992; Steuer, 1992; Witmer and Singer, 1998; Skarbez
et al., 2017;Weech et al., 2019). Presence is, thus, most commonly
described as a subjective experience of being bodily or physically
located in a mediated environment (cf. Hartmann et al., 2015b).
Beyond these commonalities, the understanding of presence
varies mainly in one point: Some researchers point out the
importance of agency and suggest that it is not only the feeling of
being there that constitutes presence, but also the feeling of being
able to interact with the VE. Schubert et al. (1999) propose that
presence arises when the VE offers opportunities to actively act
within the mediated environment. In line with this assumption,
Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005) propose that “the sense of “being
there” in a VE is grounded on the ability to “do there”” (p.
9). Accordingly, Wirth et al. (2007) suggest that the occurrence
of presence not only refers to the sensation of being located
inside the mediated environment, but also to the sensation of
being able to take action in the mediated environment (e.g.,
moving objects). Wirth et al. assume that this aspect of presence
is particularly important in the context of video games or VR
environments, but less important for books and films. Potential
actions, however, have not been able to establish themselves as
a second dimension of presence besides “being there” and are
widely neglected in current studies on presence.
In this opinion article, we focus on Presence in VR or
in VEs, respectively. Presence refers to mediated content in
general and has thus been applied to various types of media
including movies and TV shows (e.g., Kim and Biocca, 1997;
Lee, 2004). The medium sets the framework in which presence
experiences can occur: previous studies revealed that along with
technical progress and increased system immersion (graphical
resolution, positional tracking, possibilities of interaction up to
VR glasses with a complete enclosure of the user), modern VR
settings are able to generate higher presence than traditional
media (for an overview see Hartmann et al., 2015b). This sets
presence experiences in VR apart. As mentioned above, Wirth
et al. (2007) assume that compared to traditional media, the
perception of possible action is an important factor within VE.
Most commonly, however, the concept of presence is still used
independently of the medium and the definition of presence
in the context of VR is exactly the same as the definition
of presence in other media (e.g., Schuemie et al., 2001). For
example, presence was described as a form of being there in film
(e.g., Bracken and Skalski, 2010) and in VR (e.g., Slater, 2018).
Accordingly, in current studies on VR presence is understood
in the sense of “being there” as well. For example, presence
is defined as “the extent to which one feels present in the
mediated environment, rather than in the immediate physical
environment” (Wehden et al., 2021, p. 6), “the extent to which
one feels present in the mediated environment” (Yang et al., 2021,
p. 2), “the subjective perception of being in a particular place,
even if situated physically somewhere else” (Jaalama et al., 2021,
p. 2), or as “the subjective feeling of the user of physically being in
the virtual environment rather than in the place where the body
is located” (Rauscher, 2021, p. 128).
However, VR is fundamentally different from other media;
it is highly immersive and it disconnects the user from the
surrounding “real” world. This entails that the conventional
definition of presence needs to be refined. In the following,
we briefly reflect on existing definitions, explore alternative
concepts, and present our own solution for a more complete
and contemporary definition of presence. The key elements of
our proposed new definition of Presence as a two-dimensional
construct are summarized in Figure 1.
Presence as Being There
Allocating attention is the essential element in many concepts of
presence. For example, Lombard and Ditton (1997) use the term
illusion of non-mediation. This illusion occurs when a person does
no longer perceive the mediated environment as being displayed
by a media device. According to Slater (2018), it is a perceptual
illusion, where “the brain-body system automatically and rapidly
reacts” (p. 432) to content presented in VR, i.e., it does not
require higher-order cognitive processing. A similar concept was
proposed by Wirth et al. (2007), according to which presence
occurs when attention is allocated to the mediated environment
being the user’s primary egocentric frame of reference (PEFR).
As many authors have pointed out, the sensation of being there
depends on the amount of attentional resources allocated to the
virtual world rather than to internal thoughts or non-available
sensory information (e.g., Baños et al., 1999; Brown and Cairns,
2004;Witmer et al., 2005; for an overview see Skarbez et al., 2017).
We argue that this shift of attentional focus is the main concept
that underlies the sense of being there.
Accordingly, we define being there as the allocation of
attentional resources to the mediated world and the sensation
of perceptually being surrounded by the VE. Thus, presence
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FIGURE 1 | Being there and perceived realism as dimensions of presence.
is commonly associated with increased attention toward the
VE and decreased attention toward external factors and the
medium itself. However, presence in this sense could also be
achieved by other activities requiring our attention such as
focusing on the street while driving a car—clearly not a task
where one would use the term presence. We question Slater’s
binary view (see Slater and Steed, 2000) of a virtual experience
as being either real (“I am there”) or not (“I am not there”),
based on a probability estimation. Wissmath et al. (2011), who
analyzed mental self-localization during a virtual roller-coaster
ride, were able to show that self-localization is indeed not
tied to one single place: their results revealed that participants
could distribute their self-localization in both realities, and the
two values added up. This suggests that it is possible to feel
located in two places at the same time. A binary view might be
true for judgments about reality itself (what we experience can
either be considered real or unreal; whereas there are certainly
varying degrees of confidence attributed to the latter). However,
research participants and players arguably rarely expect a virtual
world to reflect the true state of reality. They are always aware
of the artificial nature of the virtual scene unless technology
improves significantly in the near future (this is in line with
Slater’s considerations about presence; see Slater, 2018, p. 432).
Nevertheless, participants and players are usually willing to
temporarily accept the new environment as the primary source
of sensory information (cf. PEFR mentioned above; Wirth et al.,
2007) and estimate how close to reality the environment is
being experienced. Typical reactions like “the visuals of this
game did not impress me much” or “it felt almost real” reflect
this gradual sense of perceived realism of the virtual world.
Importantly, this label of the VE is not solely determined by the
virtual world itself but depends on the individual characteristics
of the user and situational aspects (see section Presence as
Perceived Realism).
In summary, “being there” refers to the sensation of being
surrounded by a VE, with attentional resources allocated toward
that environment (cf. Figure 1).
Presence as Perceived Realism
Here, our focus is on presence in VEs. VEs create a virtual world
that is supposed to be realistic and believable. Absorbing the
user in VE is the easy part. It is simply achieved by blocking
external stimuli and expose the user to visual sensory input
provided by the HMD, which is the dominant source of sensory
information. However, having a sense of being there does not
necessarily imply a high level of perceived realism and, thus,
a high level of presence. For example, a non-realistic world
filled with simple geometrical shapes can elicit the feeling of
being there, simply because it is the only environment providing
sensory stimulation. Even though the attentional focus is directed
to the VE in this case, one does arguably not perceive it as highly
realistic, coherent, or believable. In our opinion, this problem
is demonstrated by a recent study, which found that a plausible
VE does not lead to higher presence ratings compared to a non-
plausible VE (Hofer et al., 2020). The authors conclude that
plausibility violations are not that crucial for a VR experience. It is
possible, however, that the operationalization of presence (Spatial
Presence Experience Scale SPES, Hartmann et al., 2015a), which
measured presence as being there, is responsible for the fact
that no difference occurred. Due to the HMD, the participants
were fully surrounded by the virtual world in the non-plausible
and in the plausible environment. Thus, it is not surprising that
their subjective assessment of being there was the same. Without
the assessment of perceived realism, the absence of plausibility
remains unnoticed. This is why we suggest a two-dimensional
operationalization of presence that includes perceived realism
as an important dimension that is needed for a more complete
understanding of presence.
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We define perceived realism as the user’s individual judgment
about the degree of realism of the VE, in terms of (1) virtual
objects, sounds and scenes, (2) credibility and plausibility of
the story and its characters, and (3) naturalness and ease of
the interaction with the VE. This is a new definition which
we propose and which will have to be tested and, if necessary,
adapted in future research. It has to be pointed out that perceived
realism is not a mere function of the technical properties of
the VR system but rather results from the interaction between
individual expectations and technical properties such as tracking
quality and visual appearance of objects. For example, the more
natural the way of interacting with the VE (e.g., being able to
physically walk instead of using controllers), the more realistic
it appears, usually. This corresponds with those definitions
that include possible actions as a relevant aspect of presence
experiences (cf. Schubert et al., 1999; Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005; Wirth et al., 2007). But some people prefer having simple
controls while others enjoy the possibility of having more
advanced controls (tracking each finger separately, for example).
Similarly, users typically compare the look of virtual objects
to real world objects and judge the level of congruence (e.g.,
textures, shades, proportions, or number of details; Sutcliffe and
Gault, 2004). This results in a judgment about the credibility of
the VE. But a VE does not need to depict a real-life scenario in all
cases. An experience could involve extremely large strawberries
in a field, for example. These strawberries may not be congruent
with their real counterparts in terms of size and shape, but if the
user is able to touch and smell them and if the felt properties
confirm that they are indeed strawberries, the user perceives the
scenery as real. Accordingly, Flavián et al. (2021) showed that
including the sense of a pleasant smell is not per se effective to
increase sensory stimulation, but only if it is congruent with the
virtual scenario.
Narrative elements (e.g., the story line or the historical
embedding of the narrative) and characters (e.g., their fidelity or
actions) are also evaluated in terms of consistency and plausibility
(cf. suspension-of-disbelief; Park et al., 2010; Gorini et al., 2011).
Here, too, it is not necessary that the story is close to real life.
The story could involve fantasy characters or depict elements that
are impossible, like traveling with lightspeed. In this regard, VR
experiences share similarities with abstract art, which is often far
from being close to reality. The viewer can nevertheless enjoy
the piece, pick up underlying themes and expressions, interpret
the artist’s intentions behind the painting and spot references
such as color allegories. Abstract art is well able to involve
viewers in an alternative reality and thus to induce enjoyment and
satisfaction. Thus, abstraction and realism are not polar opposites
but can go hand in hand. A VR user can perceive an abstract
environment as realistic just as a viewer of art is entangled in
the world presented by the painting. Admittedly, VR still is a
comparatively new technology and its full range of effects is not
fully explored. This is in contrast with illustrative art, which
itself has been part of human lives for thousands of years and
whose effects on the viewer have been studied and interpreted by
experts and art enthusiasts for centuries. It is thus conceivable
that the mechanisms behind liking and enjoying art are much
better understood than the impact VR can have on humans.
Nevertheless, the same basic principles apply to abstract sceneries
in art and in VR. Such an experience can create an alternative
reality that may be far away from the reality we live in but still
be consistent in itself, contain plausible analogies (e.g., the link
between cause and effect) and possess a meaningful storyline
(logical, involving). The term perceived realism emphasizes this
constructive process behind the creation of one’s own temporary
reality and is an important part of the user’s individual sense of
presence. Judgments about credibility and plausibility are also
likely to depend on individual differences between users (cf.
immersive tendency). Empirical findings support this idea, as
they show that presence is modulated by individual expectations,
personal relevance, and personality traits (Bucolo, 2004; Weibel
et al., 2010, 2011a,b,c). This, again, stresses the idea that
entering VR is an active process of constructing one’s own
temporary reality.
In contrast to being there, perceived realism was not an
essential part of influential theories of presence. Although realism
is often mentioned, it is usually only regarded as a beneficial
factor for the feeling of absorption. Perceived realism shares
similarities with Slater’s concept of Psi (2003; 2009). Psi is
the extent to which one experiences the illusion of something
happening as “really happening” (Slater, 2009, p. 3553). Psi
occurs if there is a correlation between the user’s actions and
corresponding events in the VE. However, we strongly suggest
that, in contrast to Psi, perceived realism is not just a perceptual
illusion (cf. Slater, 2009), but rather the result of a conscious
evaluation of the credibility and realness of the VE. As such,
perceived realism takes into account personal experience and
preferences. As an example, an experienced VR enthusiast will
likely disagree with the judgment of a first-time user on a visually
stunning yet otherwise unsophisticated VE (e.g., a realistic
depiction of a historic site without the ability to interact with and
explore the site).
Taken together, we define perceived realism as the user’s
individual judgment of the degree of realism of a virtual world
(cf. Figure 1). This judgment is influenced by the nature of
virtual objects, sounds, or scenes as well as by the plausibility
of a story and its characters. We assume that the judgment
about the interaction with the VE is a further factor that affects
perceived realism.
The Benefit of a Two-Dimensional
Conceptualization
Perceived realism and attention are oftenmistakenly blended into
the term being there. Lombard and Ditton (1997), for example,
assume that an illusion of non-mediation is more likely to
occur when perceived realism is high. This suggests a correlation
between being there and perceived realism. While this is possible
for traditional media like movie theaters and television, it does
not really apply to VR environments since being there is easy to
achieve. Indeed, the low priority attributed to perceived realism
can partly be explained by the fact that the presence literature
is largely based on research with early versions of HMDs with
narrow field-of-views or non-VR media such as videos and
desktop games. Presence inmodernVR is different from presence
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experienced when exposed to traditional media. The user has no
longer to close the gap between the physical place surrounding
the computer screen and the environment that is displayed on
the screen (cf. Slater and Wilbur, 1997).
To our knowledge, three studies were carried out to gather
insights into the dimensionality that underlies the phenomenon
of presence (Lessiter et al., 2001; Schubert et al., 2001; Witmer
et al., 2005). These factor analyses yielded either realness
(Schubert et al., 2001), naturalness (Lessiter et al., 2001), or
sensory fidelity (Witmer et al., 2005) as a part of the final factorial
structure. This underlines the need to consider perceived realism
when conceptualizing presence. In many presence theories, some
form of realism is mentioned but usually not addressed in detail
(e.g., Lombard and Ditton, 1997; Witmer and Singer, 1998).
Realism is, however, an integral part of separate conceptions
such as fidelity (Alexander et al., 2005), reality judgment (Baños
et al., 2000), stimulus fidelity (Stoffregen et al., 2003), coherence
(Skarbez et al., 2017), and perceived realism (e.g., Busselle and
Bilandzic, 2008; Rovira et al., 2009; Skarbez, 2016).
This latter strain of research has connected perceived realism
to higher-order cognitive operations that influence how the VE
is being experienced (Gilbert, 2016; Skarbez, 2016). It has been
proposed that perceived realism directly relates to the user’s
sense of presence and that it reflects a higher level of cognitive
processing (i.e., havingmeta-thoughts about one’s VR experience;
Hofer et al., 2020) that is different from the more automatic
processing of being there (cf. the position of Slater, 2018,
cited above). Whereas, being there is regarded as a necessary
component of presence, subjective realism is a contributing factor
that modulates the top-down experience of spatial presence
(cf. Hofer et al., 2020). According to Skarbez (2016), perceived
realism or—in his term—plausibility is the extent to which the
VEmeets the user’s expectations, given the user’s prior knowledge
about the real world and the virtual world depicted in the VE
(which could entail a fantasy world like Star Wars, which is
well-established but not real; see also Gilbert, 2016). Currently,
there is only little research about the effects of perceived realism
in VR and the conducted studies generally show that higher
realism goes along with stronger presence (e.g.,Welch et al., 1996;
Regenbrecht and Schubert, 2002; Krcmar et al., 2011; Skarbez,
2016), although the effect is often small and a recent study
found no effect (Hofer et al., 2020). Perceived realism was usually
conceived as either the sensory quality of the VE or as an objective
mistake or inconsistence in the virtual scene (e.g., objects in
the wrong order). As outlined above, we assume that the null
result found by Hofer et al. (2020) is interesting because it is the
result of the one-dimensional operationalization of presence (the
experience of being there). Research about subjective realism in
VE—i.e., virtual worlds that seem implausible only for certain
users but not for others because of individual differences in
expectations about the VE—are still rare (Bouchard et al., 2012,
being a notable exception). The lack of experimental studies may
reflect how presence research so far has mainly adhered to the
traditional definitions of presence.
Along with the abovementioned authors, we think that
the concept of (subjective) realism complements the sense
of being there and that it needs to be incorporated into a
comprehensive definition of presence in VR. In line with Busselle
and Bilandzic, we have chosen the term perceived realism.
However, while Busselle and Bilandzic describe perceived realism
as the plausibility and coherence of a narrative, we suggest a
broader definition of perceived realism that includes not only
the story, but also the coherence and plausibility of the virtual
world itself as well as the ease and realism of interactions with
the physical components of the VE. Interaction is an important
element because, unlike traditional media, storytelling in VR
often requires the user to perform certain physical actions, such
as opening a door.
To date, no concept of presence clearly distinguishes between
being there as a form of attentional allocation and perceived
realism. We claim that the almost exclusive focus on being there
without separating attentional allocation and perceived realism
is problematic for VR because the meaning of being there is
highly ambiguous in VR, and therefore leads to confusions in
participants. Unlike television, users are already there if equipped
with a modern HMD: the entire visual field is taken in by the
display, headphones are drowning external noise, and haptic
devices emulate the sense of touch (cf. McMahan, 2003). Since
VR devices effectively surround users with the virtual world,
presence as the sense of being there is almost inevitably very high,
even if a VE is not convincing at all (e.g., poor resolution). Indeed,
there is no need of getting somewhere if one is there already.
This conceptual flaw is evident in questionnaires that are
not properly adapted to modern VR and hinder a clear
operationalization of presence because they include confusing
questions. For example, it is not clear how participants are
supposed to respond to an item like “how much did the
visual/auditory aspects of the environment involve you?” from
the Presence Questionnaire (PQ; Witmer et al., 2005). In VR,
there is no external sensory information from the world other
than the visual and auditory inputs provided by the VR. Yet
other widely used questionnaires fail to differentiate between VR
and other media experiences. The item “somehow I felt that
the virtual world surrounded me” from the Igroup Presence
Questionnaire (IPQ; Schubert et al., 2001) is another example.
Being surrounded by the virtual world is literally inevitable.
The Slater-Usoh-Steed Presence Questionnaire (SUS; Usoh et al.,
2000; cf. Hein et al., 2018) uses the item, “during the time of
the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your sense of
being in the office space, or of being elsewhere?” For all items
of this kind, it is difficult to give a conclusive answer because
participants are fully surrounded by the VE, yet they know that
they are in an office space. Skarbez (2016, p. 73ff) demonstrated
that traditional questionnaires are still able to detect overall levels
of presence when realism was manipulated but also suggests that
the realism component itself was not captured well by the PQ and
the SUS.
In fact, participants in our own VR studies regularly report
difficulties when filling out presence questionnaires (e.g., Weber
et al., 2019, 2020a,b). They often wonder whether they are
expected to answer, “I totally agree” because a VE perceptually
surrounded them or whether they are supposed to answer, “I
totally disagree” because the VE was not realistic and they were at
any moment in time aware of the office space surrounding them
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despite not seeing it. The ambiguity of questionnaire items instills
different response strategies in presence questionnaires, which is
highly undesirable for research. As Weibel et al. (2011c) state,
“almost every empirical study on presence includes subjective
data in terms of questionnaires” (p. 866). Interestingly, this
also applies to the studies conducted in VR, and this is highly
problematic. Presence—measured by questionnaires—is often
used as a covariate in VR experiments. Yet it is not clear whether
the existing questionnaires, in fact, measure what is intended: is
it the allocated attention to the VE that is expected to affect the
output variable or is it the judgment about the realism of the VE?
Depending on the research context, it could be only one of the
two dimensions or both.
The interpretation of items could be markedly improved by
separating between items measuring the sense of being there
as an attentional focus on the one hand, and items measuring
the perceived realism of the VE on the other hand. This would
allow for a clearer operationalization of presence and more valid
measurements. In our own research, we have often observed that
the high absorption capacity of VR has led to a ceiling effect
in presence measurements. The focus on being there neglects
important aspects of the virtual world and leads to ambiguities
and a reduced range of possible responses in questionnaires. If
perceived realism is included as a separate dimension, we assume
that response ambiguities can be prevented and the variance of
presence measurements will be increased. Furthermore, with the
separation of being there and perceived realism, questionnaires
could more easily be adapted to different forms of media
and allow to better differentiate between immersive and non-
immersive experiences across media.
It is noteworthy that both, the PQ and IPQ, already include
a realism component (labeled “realness” and “sensory fidelity”).
However, we seek for a new, substantially advanced, concept
of realism that goes beyond quality assessments of the VE’s
sensual properties. A judgment about the plausibility of the
virtual world is lacking. A graphically unsophisticated world
does not necessarily go along with a low presence measure but
can very well be experienced as realistic in certain scenarios.
The other way around, a visually stunning experience does not
necessarily lead to high presence. Presence always depends on the
user’s individual predispositions and situational aspects, aspects
that are not reflected in current presence questionnaires (see
Brackney and Priode, 2017, p. E72 for a discussion about this
aspect with regard to the realism subscale of the PQ). Such
aspects require new questionnaire items (e.g., “to what extent did
the virtual environment meet your expectations concerning the
realism of virtual objects?” “did the virtual experience provide
a believable and coherent story for you?”) or completely new
questionnaire formats. Additionally, the PQ specifically lacks
items about the realism of the storyline and characters and
instead focuses mainly on (visual) sensory fidelity. As for the
IPQ, the items that measure realism are the following: “How
real did the virtual world seem to you?” “How much did your
experience in the virtual environment seem consistent with your
real world experience?” “How real did the virtual world seem
to you?” and “The virtual world seemed more realistic than the
real world.” At first glance, these items look straightforward but
they require the user to give a judgment about the objective
realness of the experience instead of the user’s perceived realness.
Objective realism rather refers to system immersion in Slater’s
(2003; 2009) sense. Since the consensus is that presence is a
subjective experience (e.g., Heeter, 1992), measuring subjective
or—as we name it—perceived realism is essential for determining
the degree of presence in VR.
Presence in VR positively affects various output measures
such as task performance and therapy outcome (e.g., Ragan
et al., 2010; Riva et al., 2015). Thus, evoking presence is
essential for VR development as well as for research. It is not
surprising that presence has been identified as a design ideal for
synthetic environments (e.g., Draper et al., 1998). Being there is
undoubtedly an essential part of the presence experience. It is
especially important for traditional media such as desktop games
and movies where one’s senses are not completely surrounded by
the medium and the user has to actively focus on the mediated
world. In some cases, the feeling of being there might even be
the main source of presence. In VR, however, where one quite
literally enters an alternative physical reality, not much is needed
to create a strong sense of being there and, thus, credible, and
convincing VEs play a much more important role in achieving
strong feelings of presence.
Taken together, we claim that presence in VR is more
than just being absorbed by a mediated world; it depends on
believable and credible as well as plausible and coherent virtual
surroundings that constitute the virtual world. In our view, the
feeling of presence occurs if a mediated environment (1) captures
and maintains our attention and (2) is perceived as realistic.
Therefore, we suggest dividing presence into the two dimensions
being there and perceived realism. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
DISCUSSION
Current research on presence does either not consider perceived
realism or a distinction between perceived realism and being
there is widely missing. This resulted not only in contradictory
definitions of presence but also in numerous confusing
questionnaire items. Unlike other media, VR creates a highly
absorbing experience and evoking a sense of being there is almost
automatically achieved by rendering potentially competing
external sensory input unavailable. Indeed, creating credible and
realistic VEs is crucial for achieving strong feelings of presence in
VR. Enhancing the perceived realism of VEs is amain focus of VR
development. Yet, it is often neglected in theoretical conceptions
or blended in with being there as a form of attentional allocation.
Perceived realism is especially relevant for VR experiences, not
only because they effectively block external sensory input but
also for the better use of the multi-sensory stimulation that is
possible with advanced technology. VR experiences have already
been enhanced with the sense of touch (e.g., Rietzler et al.,
2018), weight (e.g., Zenner and Krüger, 2017), and even smell
(e.g., Flavián et al., 2021; this paper also provides an up-to-date
overview of multisensory research). There are devices which let
users naturally walk through the VE on a treadmill (cf. Wehden
et al., 2021) or with specially designed shoes (e.g., Reinhardt et al.,
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2019). Additionally, haptic gloves or even whole body tracking
suits have emerged (e.g., Loughlan, 2017). Already since the early
days of immersive media, the goal was to stimulate as many
senses as possible to create a sense of reality (cf. Heilig, 1992, as
an early example). This goes far beyond traditional media which
are not designed to directly emulate sensory input. Therefore,
the definition of presence in VR is significantly different from
other media and requires a new approach that emphasizes the
importance of perceived realism.
Speaking of all the technological advancements in VR,
however, there is also a significant caveat to keep in mind: simply
combiningmultiple sensory simulators is no guarantee to achieve
a high sense of presence. With more elaborate equipment there
are also higher expectations toward the technology that raise the
bar for effectively perceiving realism. Including the smell and
taste of an object is of no use if the experience of touching it
does not keep up with the other stimulations (an example being
the study from Bennett and Stevens, 2005; see also Culbertson
and Kuchenbecker, 2016; Zhao and Follmer, 2018). An apple that
smells like an apple but feels like a piece of cardboard may be
enough to irritate a user and disrupt perceived reality.
An interesting example where a new, VR-specific definition of
a research concept has successfully been established, is provided
by the three sub-components model of the sense of embodiment,
introduced by Kilteni et al. (2012). According to the authors,
experiencing the same sensations toward a virtual body as to
one’s own biological body requires a sense of self-location (the
virtual body’s position is congruent with one’s own position),
a sense of agency (the virtual body’s actions correspond to my
own actions), and a sense of body ownership (the virtual body
feels and looks like my own body). This concept successfully
expands the definition of embodiment, which has been used
for explaining the effect of accepting an artificial limb as a
part of one’s own body (cf. rubber-hand illusion; Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998). Having a sense of agency together with a realistic
depiction of a limb which is located at the same position as
one’s own limb is effectively only possible in VR. Advanced
studies in body ownership used a combination of clues in VR
to successfully embody participants in artificial bodies or body
parts (e.g., Jo et al., 2017). This rapid development required a
new and advanced definition of the concept of embodiment,
which resulted in the three sub-components model, mentioned
above. This approach has since gained popularity in the research
community and is now regularly used to define embodiment
in recent studies with virtual bodies (cf. Fribourg et al., 2020).
The situation with embodiment is thus comparable to that of
presence. Here, too, we believe that technological development
has led to a situation where the research community could benefit
from a refined definition. We even go one step further and claim
that the study of presence in VR only makes sense if the concept
is in fact redefined. Here we propose perceived realism as a new
and separate dimension of presence.
Including questions about the perceived realism of a VE
and separating them from questions asking about attentional
allocation could reduce the confusion in presence questionnaires.
To our knowledge, the distinction of two dimensions of presence
will provide a clearer operationalization, which will make effects
of presence on other measures better interpretable. Like the
sense of embodiment, which has been proposed to be split
into the components sense of self-location, sense of agency,
and sense of body ownership, presence needs to be assessed
with sub-components that together form the overall sense of
presence: being there and perceived realism. This will ultimately
close the gap between developers’ main concerns about presence
(perceived realism) and the researchers’ focus on presence (being
there). As mentioned, it is not only important to measure the
realism associated with each sense being stimulated. It also
necessary to keep track of possible interactions between them and
ask the user about his integrated sense of perceived realism.
A compelling virtual world needs to be believable, authentic,
and visually appealing in addition to capturing attention. This
is especially true for professional VR applications that rely
on maximal comparability to the real world, such as training
environments for surgeons, firefighters, or pilots. A clearer
separation of being there and perceived realism makes presence
more generalizable across media and especially more applicable
to VR. In terms of VR, questionnaires need to focus on the
perceived realism of the VE. This way, game designers could
obtain subjective quality measures of VEs. Researchers could
use more detailed presence measures that separate being there
and perceived realism. This will lead to stronger and clearer
results and strengthen the correlations between presence and
different output variables such as enjoyment, therapy outcome,
or learning.
This opinion paper aims to initiate a discussion about what
constitutes presence in VR. We have proposed a plausible
definition that is based on existing findings. Nevertheless, in a
first step, future research is needed to challenge this definition.
An evaluation of the proposed definition could be
accomplished by developing a new questionnaire that
incorporates relevant aspects in the context of perceived
realism, e.g., the perception of virtual objects, sounds and scenes;
plausibility of the story; naturalness and ease of interactions.
As part of the questionnaire construction, an appropriate item
pool would need to be generated to map these aspects (for an
overview on scale development see for example Irwing et al.,
2018). Combined with existing questions that depict presence
as being there, the dimensionality of presence in VE could
be extracted and it could be tested whether the dimensions
we propose can be confirmed empirically. If so, it would be
interesting to investigate whether being there and perceived
realism are orthogonal dimensions of an overall presence
construct or whether they are correlated.
A new questionnaire would help to learn more about (1)
the extent to which being there and perceived realism influence
possible outcome variables and to assess (2) which dimension
explains more variance. For this purpose, it would be promising
to conduct an experiment in which being there (high vs. low) and
perceived realism (high vs. low) are manipulated in a 2×2 design.
This could help to find out more about the relative influence of
the two dimensions. Below we outline such an experiment. It is a
suggestion that might be useful to find out the influence that the
two dimensions can exert. The idea is to transfer a well-known
conventional video game, which involves simple graphics yet is
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fun to play, into VR. A good example could be Tetris (Pajitnov,
1985), but also any other game involving simple geometrical
shapes could work; another idea is the use of puzzle games,
where there already exist several examples of sophisticated and
realistic VR implementations (e.g., The Talos Principle, 2015;
for an overview on engaging games see Prensky, 2001). These
games are very popular since they involve challenging tasks, they
provide immediate performance feedback and ways to directly
interact with the virtual world and thus, they can be adapted
to either a highly involving or a completely uninvolving VR
experience. This in turn allows to manipulate the dimension
“being there”: The condition high level of being there could consist
of an exciting version of the game (involving challenges and
feedback on one’s performance) so that attentional resources
are bound by the VE. The condition low level of being there
is a version of the same game, but in a version that is not
involving at all with the result that the attentional resources
are not allocated toward the VE; this could for example be an
overly simple and unentertaining version of the game, perhaps in
combination with a repetitive and unchallenging task. The factor
perceived realism could be varied as follows: in the condition
high level of perceived realism, the game could be embedded in
an overall story (where the player is on track to solve a mystery
or rescue another character, etc.) and with more emphasis on
a realistic experience in terms of high vividness, refined visual
scenes and the involvement of multiple sensory cues (haptic
feedback when touching the shapes, shapes appear in a realistic
amusement-park-like scenario, etc.). In contrast, the condition
low level of perceived realism should not involve any (logically
structured) storyline, characters, or surrounding environment
and the environment could look Minecraft-like (cf. Minecraft,
2011) with low-resolution. Of course, rigorous study demands
that only a few characteristics are manipulated at once and surely,
a whole series of experiments will be needed to test all of these
contributing factors.
We are convinced that a more thorough assessment of the VR
experience will be beneficial for research and applications alike.
VE’s are now rapidly gaining importance, and it is by all means
necessary to better understand the dimensions that are involved
in order to exploit VR’s full potential, and also further develop the
technology so that it serves society best.
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